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Abstract
Hedge funds use a wide variety of investment styles, although many people have the
perception that they are a relatively homogenous group with similar strategies to generate
returns. Understanding the differences in the risk and return structure of hedge fund strate-
gies is crucial to making a good investment decision. This paper examines the performance
of 13 hedge fund strategies in the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index, during a 20-years long
period ranging from 1995 to 2015. In contrast to previous research, our study encompasses
performance analysis on multiple long-term bull and bear stock market periods. Our study
provides potential hedge fund investors with valuable information about the best performing
strategies in different market conditions. The results show that returns vary greatly between
different strategies and time periods.
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The first hedge fund was founded in 1949 by Alfred Winslow Jones, who used a market
neutral investment strategy by taking long positions in securities he found undervalued and
at the same time taking short positions in overvalued securities. Still today, the popular per-
ception is that hedge funds have a reasonably well-defined market neutral strategy (Brown
& Goetzmann, 2001). While this strategy was used by the first hedge funds, modern hedge
funds have evolved into a heterogeneous group with multifaceted organizational structures.
The term ”hedge fund” now covers a broad range of investment philosophies that goes be-
yond the original long-short strategy. However, there are a few common characteristics that
help us define hedge funds. Some of them are: flexible investment strategies, unregulated or-
ganizational structure, substantial managerial investment in the fund and strong managerial
incentives (Ackermann et al. 1999, Brown & Goetzmann, 2001).
This study aims to examine the difference in performance of various hedge fund strategies
in bull and bear stock market periods. As Edwards and Caglayan (2001) note, one of the
primary motives for investing in hedge funds is to hedge against falling stock prices, it is of
great importance to understand how different investment strategies perform in bear markets.
We use data from Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index and analyze the return of their 13 strategy
indices to draw a conclusion about their ability to beat the market and also, which strategy
is the most successful in both bull and bear market periods.
We test their performance by benchmarking the strategy indices to a global stock market
index and see if the hedge fund strategies show statistically significant superior returns com-
pared to the market. Furthermore, we also compare the risk-adjusted returns amongst the
individual strategies in different time periods. An analysis of the estimated beta coefficients
is also conducted as we make an attempt to derive two beta-neutral hedge fund portfolios.
Our starting point in examining whether hedge funds are able to beat the market is the
research conducted by M. C. Jensen in 1968 where he derived a risk-adjusted measure of
portfolio performance, which is nowadays known as Jensen’s Alpha. He based his research on
the CAPM-model which was introduced a few years earlier by Sharpe, Lintner and Treynor
(Jensen, 1968). Jensen (1968) finds that the mutual funds in his sample are not able to
outperform the market. Very little evidence is found that individual funds can perform
significantly better than what could be expected (Jensen, 1968).
A few years later, Fama (1970) introduces the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which
states that the price of an asset fully reflects all available information to investors. The
theory supports the findings of previous research that on average, mutual funds should not
be able to outperform the market consistently on a risk-adjusted basis (Fama, 1970).
Brown (1995) sets out to answer if the effect of persistence in fund performance is sig-
nificant for investors to earn excess return over the market, just by choosing the previous
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winners. He compares the return of a portfolio strategy where you invest in the highest
performing fund of the previous year to one where you do the opposite. The results are that
winning funds tend to deliver a higher return in future years, however they bear higher total
risk.
Ackermann et al. (1999) find that structural advantages of hedge fund strategies can
help generate superior returns to the market. They also find that the strategies have an
average significant excess return (alpha) of approximately half a percent. Furthermore, they
note that there is substantial literature and research on mutual funds but less in the field
of hedge funds. One reason for the lower number of studies on hedge funds could be that
the industry is self-reporting. The lack of reporting requirements create a bias that makes
it problematic for authors to come across reliable data (Capocci & Hubner, 2004).
However, there still exists literature that examines the risk and performance of hedge
funds. Brown and Goetzmann (2001) notes that the risk exposure from investing in a hedge
fund largely depends on a funds style affiliation. This result builds on an earlier study by
Brown et al. (1999) where they conclude that performance persistence in hedge funds is
due to style effects rather than management skills. Hedge funds often have low correlation
with other financial securities. Both Fung and Hsieh (1997) and Liang (1999) find that low
correlation between hedge funds and other financial securities can significantly increase the
risk-return profile in a portfolio.
Most previous research on hedge fund performance have not distinguished between bull
and bear markets since their time window under review (1990–2000 in most cases) has been a
particularly bullish period on the stock market (Capocci et al, 2005). Moreover, hedge fund
data collected prior to 1994 is likely to suffer from significant survivorship bias according to
Capocci and Hubner (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2000). Several studies choose not to include
data prior to 1994. An exception to this is Edwards and Caglayan (2001), who studies the
performance of hedge funds and commodity funds during 1990–1998 with periods of both
falling and rising stock prices.
The results from the research of Edwards and Caglayan (2001) reveal that only three
hedge fund strategies1 protect investors during bear stock market periods. They also find
that the best performing strategies in bull periods are the best ones in bear markets. In
their paper they define a bull stock market as a period when the monthly return of the S&P
500 is 1 % or more and a bear stock market when the S&P 500 drops by 1 % or more during
a month. In our study, we use another definition to see how long-term bull and bear stock
market periods affect performance of different hedge fund strategies.
There are a few other studies examining hedge fund performance in longer lasting bear
1Market neutral, event driven and macro strategies were superior in bear markets.
6 Performance of Hedge Fund Strategies in Bull and Bear Markets
market periods. For example, Liang (2001) use data from the time of the Asian crisis in
1997 as their bearish sub-period. While this period is relatively short, Capocci and Hubner
(2004) and Capocci et al. (2005) use data from 1994–2002 which enables them to study a 32
months bearish period from April 2000 to December 2002. They draw the conclusion that
most hedge funds significantly outperforms the market during the whole test period but this
result is mostly due to the bullish sub-period between 1994 and 2000. The best performing
strategy was the market neutral strategy. We use a different database than Capocci and
Hubner (2004) which might lead to that we obtain different results.
In contrast to previous research, our study is more extensive than other authors in the
sense that it encompasses data from multiple unambiguously bull and bear sub-periods. This
improves the reliability of our results, since it includes more than one period. In addition,
much of the prior research that involves hedge fund strategy performances were conducted
before the financial crisis, which leaves a gap for our study to fill.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze and investigate the risk-adjusted performance of
different hedge fund strategies during unambiguously long-term uptrends or downtrends on
the global stock market. We do this by analyzing the monthly returns of different strategies
during time periods that shows a clear up or down trend on the market. For example, the
rally leading to the IT-bubble in 2000 is considered as a bull period and the financial crisis in
2008 is considered as a bear period. This study contributes to existing research by examining
the performance of hedge fund strategies during multiple long-term trends in the market.
The study also reveal results that are more up-to-date since the analysis is made on data
that is sampled from 1995 to 2015.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section I, we present the hedge fund database
that we use along with a subsection with Credit Suisse’s definitions of the different hedge
fund strategies. We also explain the choice of time periods for our analysis. Our method
is explained in Section II. Section III contains the empirical results of our estimations and
tests. In this section, we have several subsections where we analyze the different strategies
considering absolute return, excess return of the market, and risk-adjusted return. We also
make an attempt to construct optimal portfolios by using our obtained results. Section IV
explains how various data conditioning biases can affect the obtained results. Section V is
the concluding section, where we end with a short discussion about the main findings and
its implications along with suggestions for future research.
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I. Data
A. Database
The data we use when conducting our research comes from the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund
Database which consists of approximately 9 000 funds. In more detail, we use data from
an index called the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index (CSHFI), which is derived from their
database and currently consists of around 375 hedge funds that meet the requirements of the
index. The requirements for being in the index is that the fund has a minimum of $50 million
in assets under management, a minimum one-year track record, and current audited financial
statements.
Credit Suisse does not limit its index to any particular geographical region and may very
well include funds that are managed in different countries around the world. The index was
the industry’s first – and remains the leading – asset-weighted hedge fund index. In contrast
to equal-weighted indices, which do not take the size of the fund into account, asset-weighted
indices gives a more accurate depiction of the return in an asset class (Credit Suisse, 2016).
Apart from the composite Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index, there are also strategy in-
dices which has the same constituents as the CSHFI, but is divided into ten (13 including
sub-strategies) indices depending on the hedge funds investment style. A calculation agent
designates a strategy for every hedge fund that enters the index. The strategy is determined
through examination of the hedge fund’s documentation, discussions with the fund’s per-
sonnel and other relevant factors. To ensure the validity of the strategy classifications, a
calculation agent conducts statistical checks on an ongoing basis in order to identify poten-
tially misclassified hedge funds. Funds that appear to be statistical outliers are investigated
to see if there is a more appropriate strategy for them (Credit Suisse Index Rules, September
2013).
The publicly available data from Credit Suisse’s website comes in the form of monthly
returns for each hedge fund strategy and the composite index. As Ackermann et al. (1999)
points out, the use of monthly data has some strong advantages over yearly data. Using
monthly returns leads to greatly enhanced accuracy of the risk measure in terms of standard
deviation. Another negative consequence that arise from using yearly data is that large
fluctuations in returns, due to external market forces and dynamic hedge fund strategies,
can be smoothened out and thus overlooked if too few observations are used. This is not
a problem, to the same extent, when monthly returns are used. Since risk-adjusted returns
are an important part of our analysis, the accuracies of the risk measurements are critical.
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Credit Suisse’s Definitions of Hedge Fund Strategies
The following definitions are copied from Credit Suisse’s ”Hedge Fund Index Rules”
available as a downloadable document on their website (see references).
. Convertible Arbitrage: Aims to profit from the purchase of convertible securities and the subsequent
shortening of the corresponding stock when there is a pricing discrepancy made in the conversion factor
of the security. Managers typically build long positions of convertible and other equity hybrid securities
and then hedge the equity component of the long securities positions by shorting the underlying stock
or options. The number of shares sold short usually reflects a delta neutral or market neutral ratio. As
a result, under normal market conditions, the arbitrageur generally expects the combined position to be
insensitive to fluctuations in the price of the underlying stock.
. Fixed Income Arbitrage: Typically funds that attempt to generate profits by exploiting inefficiencies
and price anomalies between related fixed income securities. Funds often seek to limit volatility by
hedging exposure to the market and interest rate risk. Strategies may include leveraging long and short
positions in similar fixed income securities that are related either mathematically or economically. The
sector includes credit yield curve relative value trading involving interest rate swaps, government securities
and futures; volatility trading involving options; and mortgage-backed securities arbitrage (the mortgage-
backed market is primarily in the U.S. and over-the-counter).
. Dedicated Short Bias: Takes more short positions than long positions and earn returns by maintaining
net short exposure in long and short equities. Detailed individual company research typically forms the
core alpha generation driver of dedicated short bias managers, and a focus on companies with weak cash
flow generation is common. To affect the short sale, the manager borrows the stock from a counter-
party and sells it in the market. Short positions are sometimes implemented by selling forward. Risk
management consists of offsetting long positions and stop-loss strategies.
. Emerging Markets: Invest in currencies, debt instruments, equities and other instruments of countries
with ”emerging” or developing markets (typically measured by GDP per capita). Such countries are
considered to be in a transitional phase between developing and developed status. Examples of emerging
markets include China, India, Latin America, much of Southeast Asia, parts of Eastern Europe, and parts
of Africa. There are a number of sub-sectors, including arbitrage, credit and event driven, fixed income
bias, and equity bias.
. Equity Market Neutral: Takes both long and short positions in stocks while minimizing exposure
to the systematic risk of the market (i.e., a beta of zero is desired). Funds seek to exploit investment
opportunities unique to a specific group of stocks, while maintaining a neutral exposure to broad groups
of stocks defined, for example by sector, industry, market capitalization, country, or region. There are a
number of subsectors including statistical arbitrage, quantitative long/short, fundamental long/short and
index arbitrage. Managers often apply leverage to enhance returns.
. Global Macro: Focus on identifying extreme price valuations and leverage is often applied on the an-
ticipated price movements in equity, currency, interest rate and commodity markets. Managers typically
employ a top-down global approach to concentrate on forecasting how political trends and global macroe-
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conomic events affect the valuation of financial instruments. Profits are made by correctly anticipating
price movements in global markets and having the flexibility to use a broad investment mandate, with
the ability to hold positions in practically any market with any instrument. These approaches may be
systematic trend following models, or discretionary.
. Long/Short Equity: Invest on both long and short sides of equity markets, generally focusing on
diversifying or hedging across particular sectors, regions or market capitalizations. Managers have the
flexibility to shift from value to growth; small to medium to large capitalization stocks; and net long to
net short. Managers may also trade equity futures and options as well as equity related securities and
debt or build portfolios that are more concentrated than traditional long-only equity funds.
. Managed Futures: Often referred to as Commodity Trading Advisors or CTAs focus on investing
in listed bond, equity, commodity futures and currency markets, globally. Managers tend to employ
systematic trading programs that largely rely upon historical price data and market trends. A significant
amount of leverage is employed since the strategy involves the use of futures contracts. CTAs do not have
a particular biased towards being net long or net short any particular market.
. Multi-Strategy Characterized by their ability to allocate capital based on perceived opportunities among
several hedge fund strategies. Through the diversification of capital, managers seek to deliver consistently
positive returns regardless of the directional movement in equity, interest rate or currency markets. The
added diversification benefits reduce the risk profile and help to smooth returns, reduce volatility and
decrease asset-class and single-strategy risks. Strategies adopted in a multi-strategy fund may include,
but are not limited to, convertible bond arbitrage, equity long/short, statistical arbitrage and merger
arbitrage.
. Event Driven: Invests in various asset classes and seek to profit from potential mispricing of securities
related to a specific corporate or market event. Such events can include: mergers, bankruptcies, financial
or operational stress, restructurings, asset sales, recapitalizations, spin-offs, litigation, regulatory and
legislative changes as well as other types of corporate events. Event Driven funds can invest in equities,
fixed income instruments (investment grade, high yield, bank debt, convertible debt and distressed),
options and various other derivatives. Many managers use a combination of strategies and adjust exposures
based on the opportunity sets in each sub-sector.
Event Driven Sub-Strategies:
. Risk Arbitrage: Attempts to capture the spreads in merger or acquisition transactions involving public
companies after the terms of the transaction have been announced. The spread is the difference between
the transaction bid and the trading price. Typically, the target stock trades at a discount to the bid in
order to account for the risk of the transaction not closing successfully. In a cash deal, the manager will
typically purchase the stock of the target and tender it for the offer price at closing. In a fixed exchange
ratio stock merger, one would go long the target stock and short the acquirers stock according to the
merger ratio, in order to isolate the spread and hedge out market risk. The principal risk is deal risk,
should the deal fail to close.
. Distressed: Focus on distressed situations and invest across the capital structure of companies subject to
financial or operational distress or bankruptcy proceedings. Such securities trade at substantial discounts
to intrinsic value due to difficulties in assessing their proper value, lack of research coverage, or an inability
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of traditional investors to continue holding them. This strategy is generally long-biased in nature, but
managers may take outright long, hedged or outright short positions. Distressed managers typically
attempt to profit from the issuers ability to improve its operation or the success of the bankruptcy
process that ultimately leads to an exit strategy.
. Multi-Strategy: Managers typically invest in a combination of event driven equities and credit. Within
the equity space, sub-strategies include risk arbitrage, holding company arbitrage, equity special situa-
tions, and value equities with a hard or soft catalyst. Within the credit-oriented portion, sub-strategies
include long/short high yield credit (sub-investment grade corporate bonds), leveraged loans (bank debt,
mezzanine, or self-originated loans), capital structure arbitrage (debt vs. debt or debt vs. equity), and
distressed debt (workout situations or bankruptcies) including post-reorganization equity. Multi Strategy
Event Driven managers have the flexibility to pursue event investing across different asset classes and take
advantage of shifts in economic cycles.
B. Time Periods
The time period under analysis ranges from January 1995 to May 2015 and our goal is to
analyze multiple bull and bear periods in the modern global stock market history. In order
to do so, we divide the time period into three particularly bullish, as well as two particularly
bearish periods. The cutting points for the different time periods are determined by observing
monthly maximum and minimum values within certain time spans of a chart showing the
monthly performance of Morgan Stanley’s World Index (MSCI WI). To verify that these
time periods have strong trends, we calculate the percentage of months with positive and
negative return within each chosen time period. We also calculate the yearly average returns
and by looking at these results together, we can conclude that we have located significant
trends, and that the time periods are strong enough to consider them as either a bull or a
bear period. The results of these calculations are presented in Table I.
This above mentioned method is previously used by Capocci et al. (2005). In their study
they analyzed one bull period and one bear period, they set their cutting point to March
2000 when Russell 3000 peaked. They argued that the period before this date was a bull
period since Russell 3000 reported positive returns in 70 % of the months and the average
yearly return was 19.4 %. In the succeeding period, which they concluded was a bear period,
Russell 3000 had positive returns in 39 % of the months and the average yearly return was
-16.3 %. They argue that these trends are sufficiently strong to consider as a bull and a bear
period on the stock market without having to use more complex rules for separating bull,
bear and neutral months.
In Table I we present the summary statistics of our chosen time periods and we see
evidence for trends that are at least as strong as the ones in the study conducted by Capocci
et al. (2005). We see for example in Bear 1, that the return of MSCI World Index was
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positive in 30 % of the months and the average yearly return during that period was -22.3 %.
These figures are significantly lower than the average for MSCI WI and therefore we conclude
that we have located a time period with a strong down-trend.
Table I
Descriptive Statistics of the Time Periods
The purpose of this table is to clearly show that the time periods we have distinguished are subject to strong
trends. The columns contains the five different periods that we decided on, by observing maximum and
minimum values of the MSCI World Index. The first row presents the percentage of months that MSCI WI
reports a positive return within each of the five time periods. The second row reports the average yearly
return for MSCI WI during each of these time periods. By looking at the obtained figures, there is no doubt
that the time periods, which we found, had either unambiguously bullish or bearish trends on the global
stock market. The exact time periods are shown in Table II.
Bull 1 Bear 1 Bull 2 Bear 2 Bull 3
Months with positive return (%) 70 30 70 19 60
Average yearly return (%) 18.3 -22.3 18.1 -44.0 16.0
The periods are summarized in Table II. The first period we analyze is the bullish period
in the 1990s, starting from January 1995 and lasting until February 2000. Following this
period comes a sharp decline and a bearish period from March 2000 until September 2002.
After that, we have a look at the bullish period from October 2002 all the way to the
beginning of the financial crisis in October 2007. The financial crisis will be our next bearish
period, which ranges from November 2007 to March 2009. Then we will have a look at the
period from May 2009 to May 2015. We consider these six years as a bull market period,
even though it contains a declining period in 2011. We chose to not consider this relatively
short period as a separate bear period since we believe there to be too few observations.
Looking at Table I, we also see that MSCI WI yielded 16 % in the third bull period when
the decline in 2011 is included, therefore we do not see any particular need to divide it.
We are aware that the stock market have been declining in the second half of 2015 as
well as in the first months of 2016, and were considering to treat this as another bear period.
Since we only have very few observations, we finally decided to not include it as another
time period.
All sources providing hedge fund performance may contain some conditioning biases,
this is because reporting data on hedge funds is voluntary, therefore no source will be com-
prehensive enough to include all the hedge funds (Ackermann et al. 1999). To minimize
survivorship bias in the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Database, funds are not removed from
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Table II
Time Periods Under Analysis
This table reports the length and date specifications for each of the five time periods under analysis. The
total time period is from January 1995 until May 2015, the total number of months is 245. The shortest
time period under review is the financial crisis (16 months) and the longest is the succeeding bull period (75
months or 6 years and 3 months).
Period nickname Start Date End Date Nr. of Months
Pre-IT bubble (Bull 1) 1995–01–31 2000–03–31 63
IT crash (Bear 1) 2000–04–30 2002–09–30 30
Build-up financial crisis (Bull 2) 2002–10–31 2007–10–31 61
Finacial crisis (Bear 2) 2007–11–30 2009–02–28 16
The recovery (Bull 3) 2009–03–31 2015–05–31 75
Total number of months: 245
Table III
Number of Funds in Each Strategy Index
This table shows the number of individual hedge funds in each of Credit Suisse’s strategy indices. There
are 13 strategy indices in total, whereof three are sub-indices to event driven. The event driven index is a
composite of the three sub-indices seen in the middle column. The Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index, which
is the main index, contains of all the funds in this table. A calculation agent designates a strategy for every
hedge fund that enters the index by examination of the hedge fund’s documentation and discussions with
the fund’s personnel.
Convertible Arbitrage: 13 Event Driven: 67 Fixed Income Arbitrage: 35
Dedicated Short Bias: 3 –Distressed : 24 Global Macro: 29
Emerging Markets: 49 –Multi-Strategy : 38 Long/Short Equity: 96
Equity Market Neutral: 15 –Risk Arbitrage: 5 Managed Futures: 33
Multi-Strategy: 24
Bachelor’s thesis in finance 13
the index until they are fully liquidated or fail to meet the financial reporting requirements.
A closer look at biases will be presented in a section further down in the paper.
II. Method
In the following section we describe the different methods used to measure performance.
Although the retrieved data initially was on a monthly basis, we distinguish between monthly
and annual returns in our equations. We have chosen to denote monthly returns with small
r and annualized returns with capital R. Furthermore a bar over the letters, such as: r¯,
denotes the arithmetic mean for the returns.
To begin with, we calculate absolute returns for each hedge fund strategy index for every
time period that we observe. To examine the exposure to systematic risk, we estimate the
beta statistic using OLS-regression on a sample of all 13 strategy indices. The estimations
are not made on every individual fund in an index. Instead we estimate the beta on a
strategy index as a whole, where each index itself contains a number of funds. The number
of individual hedge funds in each index is shown in Table III.












where r = return of the index, rm = return of the market proxy and i = one monthly
observation.
Both the expected market return and the expected risk-free interest rate are assumed
to be constant throughout the time period. From the CAPM-equation, we can solve for αˆ,
which is the mean excess return for a strategy index, during any time period:
αˆ = r¯ − r¯f − βˆ · (r¯m − r¯f ) = r¯ − C, (2)
where C = c(β) is the security market line and rf = risk-free interest rate.
To calculate the expected monthly market return, we simply calculate the average monthly
return of MSCI World Index during our period from January 1995 to May 2015. To calcu-
late the risk-free interest rate, we use the average monthly returns of a U.S. 90-days treasury
bill. This is widely used as a measurement of the risk-free rate and is also used in an arti-
cle by Ackermann et al. (1999). Since risk-free interest rates can be realized on a relative
14 Performance of Hedge Fund Strategies in Bull and Bear Markets
Figure 1
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This figure shows the cumulative returns over time of Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index in comparison to the
common market proxy indices: S&P 500 and MSCI World. Time is on the horizontal axis and accumulated
return is on the vertical axis. The Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index is a composite of all 13 strategy indices.
A quick look at the graph reveals that the CS Hedge Fund Index reports higher returns than both S&P 500
and MSCI World. The returns in the figure are compounded on a monthly basis.
short-term basis of 3 months, we use the realized risk-free interest rate for every time period
instead of using a predetermined rate. The risk-free interest rate is therefore adjusted in
every time period, depending on the average yield of the U.S. 90-days treasury bill.
In order to account for sampling errors in the estimation, statistical hypothesis testing
is used to test whether the strategy indices report statistically significant excess return to
the market. This is done using one-sided t-tests with the null-hypothesis: α = 0 and the
alternative hypothesis: α > 0. From the tests we can see which strategies have outperformed
the market the most during bull, bear and the whole period and whether the results are
significant or not. We use the global MSCI World Index as our benchmark and proxy for
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market return, this is the largest global stock market index and therefore commonly used as
a proxy for market return.
We also examine the risk-adjusted return of each strategy index using the traditional
Sharpe ratio, to see if returns adjusted for risk yield similar results. Sharpe ratios can be
estimated from:




where µˆ = R¯− R¯f = risk premium of the index and σˆ = standard deviation of the index. In
our analysis, the returns used to estimate the Sharpe ratios have, accordingly with standards
set by other authors, been annualized from monthly returns, using:2
R¯ = (1 + r¯)12 − 1




We also do statistical tests on the Sharpe ratios, as the returns are estimated quantities that
can be subject to estimation errors. Not accounting for these errors can potentially lead
to inaccurate estimations of the Sharpe ratios (Lo, 2002). Standard errors are used when
conducting one-sided t-tests on the Sharpe ratios in order to determine their significance
or p-values. In the Appendix, the formulas for the standard error of the Sharpe ratio are
presented.
III. Empirical Results
In this section we present the results and do the analysis of our obtained results. In
Section A, we present the absolute return of each strategy index in the different time periods
and report which strategy that yields the highest return when risk is not accounted for.
Section B presents and analyzes the results of the test for excess return in bull periods. In
Section C we look at the results of the excess performance test in bear markets and Section
D summarizes the results when taking the total period under consideration. In Section E,
we adjust the absolute returns for risk and analyze how it affects the results. In Section F
we use the results from the previous sections to derive high performing market-neutral hedge
fund strategy portfolios.
2When you are approximating annual standard deviations from monthly ones, it is considered to be an
industry standard to multiply the monthly standard deviation by
√
12.
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A. Absolute Returns of Strategy Indices
Table IV reports the absolute returns of all hedge fund strategies during each time period.
The ”Total”-column to the far right shows the total accumulated return for all time periods.
Table IV
Estimated Betas and Absolute Return of Strategy Indices
This table reports the absolute return (%) of each strategy index and the composite Credit Suisse Hedge
Fund Index (CSHFI) in each time period. The far right column reports the total return of each strategy index
during the total time period. The table also reports the estimated betas, which measures how closely each
strategy index follow the market. The beta of MSCI World Index is equal to 1.00 since it is our benchmark
index and our proxy for market return. For example, a 1.00 % increase in MSCI WI should on average result
in a 0.55 % increase of the emerging markets strategy index. All returns are compounded on a monthly basis.
βˆ Bull 1 Bear 1 Bull 2 Bear 2 Bull 3 Total
Convertible Arbitrage 0.19 91.4 30.4 43.9 -28.5 72.2 342.1
Dedicated Short Bias -0.80 -36.8 52.0 -36.5 35.7 -65.4 -71.4
Emerging Markets 0.55 37.5 -4.2 157.8 -32.3 60.7 269.0
Equity Market Neutral 0.20 103.0 27.2 47.7 -42.4 22.7 169.5
Event Driven 0.28 110.2 12.0 105.6 -19.1 43.2 460.3
–Distressed 0.27 132.1 15.2 114.0 -22.5 58.9 604.8
–Multi-Strategy 0.29 98.8 10.3 103.8 -17.3 36.2 403.5
–Risk Arbitrage 0.15 73.5 11.4 43.2 -3.6 24.1 231.0
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.14 48.2 22.1 29.0 -27.8 75.6 196.1
Global Macro 0.14 128.1 48.3 89.1 -0.9 44.8 818.6
Long/Short Equity 0.45 223.9 -11.1 91.7 -22.0 63.4 604.1
Managed Futures -0.01 19.2 32.6 36.6 16.7 20.5 203.8
Multi-Strategy 0.16 88.6 13.7 75.9 -22.3 80.6 429.2
CSHFI 0.28 139.8 6.1 79.7 -19.5 52.5 460.8
MSCI World Index 1.00 131.5 -48.4 127.9 -55.4 106.1 150.1
The return of the CSHFI, which includes all 13 strategies, is also displayed in this table
next to the return of the MSCI WI, which we include for comparison purposes.
It is obvious by looking at Table IV that there is a large variation in return between the
strategies. The large differences are very clear when observing the total returns but they are
Bachelor’s thesis in finance 17
also distinguishable in each individual period. Ackermann et al. (1999) address the question
of whether the structural advantages of hedge fund strategies can help generating superior
returns to the market. They conclude that hedge funds’ ability to outperform the market
is dependent on the time period and strategy, which is in line with what we can observe in
Table IV.
Every hedge fund strategy index, except for dedicated short bias, earned higher returns
than MSCI WI in the total period. The very poor performance for dedicated short bias in
the total period is not surprising, since the funds within the index have a net short exposure
to the market and lose money when the market rises. On the other hand, dedicated short
bias outperforms all other strategy indices in bear stock market periods. Because of the
nature of this strategy, it will always be superior to the others in the bear periods and an
outlier in all our tests and estimations. We therefore do not put too much effort in analyzing
this index in more detail in the rest of the paper.
The returns in the total period ranges from -71.4 % for the dedicated short bias index
to +818.6 % for the global macro index. MSCI WI rose 150.1 % in the same time period.
CSHFI outperforms MSCI WI in the total period with more than three times (460.8 %). In
the bear periods all strategy indices performed better than MSCI WI, which indicates that
to some extent, they manage to hedge against down-turns on the stock market. However,
worth noting is that in the first bear period only two strategy indices had negative returns,
while 11 strategy indices reported negative returns in the second bear period. The composite
hedge fund index declined by -19.5 % in Bear 2, which indicates a poor ability for hedge funds
in general to hedge their assets in this period.
Edwards and Caglayan (2001) note that the best performing strategies in bull periods
are generally also the best ones in bear markets. We do not find any clear evidence of that
just by looking at the absolute returns in Table IV. For example, the long/short equity
index is the best performing strategy index in Bull 1, but the worst performing index in
Bull 2. The strategy index with the third lowest total return (dedicated short bias excluded)
was managed futures, but it is also the only strategy index which has positive return in all
examined time periods.
While CSHFI yields much lower positive returns in Bull 2 and Bull 3 than MSCI WI,
the return in the total time period is still more than three times higher than MSCI WI.
This seem to be because the hedge fund strategy indices declined less than MSCI WI in
the bear periods. In the first bear period, the IT-crash, only two out of 13 strategy indices
reported negative returns, while MSCI World Index declined -48.4 % during the period. The
average return of the composite CSHFI was +6.1 % in the first bear period. Hedge funds’
superior returns in the total period seem to be more a result of their ability to limit losses
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than generating extreme positive returns in bull market periods.
Table IV also reports the estimated betas for each strategy index. The beta tells us how
much a strategy index move if MSCI World Index changes 1 %. For example, the estimated
beta for using convertible arbitrage as a strategy is 0.19. If MSCI WI increase by 1 %, the
funds within the convertible arbitrage index should increase, on average, by 0.19 %. A beta
of 1 indicates perfect correlation with MSCI WI and a beta of -1 indicates perfect negative
correlation with MSCI WI. All betas for the strategy indices are relatively low compared to
stocks. The strategy index with the highest beta is emerging markets, which has a beta of
0.55.
The managed futures index has a beta close to zero (−0.01), which indicates that the
return of the funds within this strategy index are, on average, almost completely uncorrelated
with MSCI WI. All strategies together have a beta of 0.28. Only by looking at the table,
the size of the beta does not seem to be informative about the level of the returns.
B. Excess Performance in Bull Markets
In this section we will interpret and analyze the results of the test for excess return
against MSCI WI in bull periods. In Table V we present the realized monthly returns for each
strategy in excess of their respective expected returns. We have taken the systematic risk into
account using the CAPM-model and examine if the strategy indices generate excess returns
over the market and beat investments with similar systematic risk. In our calculations, we
have set the expected market return r¯m in all periods to the average monthly return of MSCI
WI from 1995 to May 2015 (0.53 %). Provided in Table V are also p-values which state the
probability of the alphas being greater than zero.
By looking at the alphas in the bull periods, we see that all strategy indices seem to
have outperformed, or at least performed the same, as their expected return with regard to
beta-risk in all three bull periods (dedicated short bias excluded). However, note that not all
of the obtained alphas are statistically significant, therefore we cannot state with certainty
that all strategy indices have alphas equal to, or greater, than zero.
Starting with a broad analysis of the results, we see evidence that the composite CSHFI,
which have all the strategy indices combined, have statistically significant positive alphas in
all three bull periods. The CSHFI had its’ highest alpha in Bull 1, amounting to 1.2 %. The
alpha in Bull 3 was 0.4 %, even though this value is lower than previous bull periods, it is
still statistically significant on a 5 % level (p-value = 0.007). An interpretation of this finding
is that, with very high probability, the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index outperformed the











Excess Returns of Strategy Indices
This table presents the excess return (Jensen’s alpha) for each strategy index in each time period relative to the market. We use the MSCI World
Index as a benchmark for market return. The obtained alphas should be interpreted as the average monthly excess return with regards to systematic
risk. The test is done with a one sided t-test, with the null-hypothesis being that the strategy indices do not report excess returns (α = 0 in the
CAPM-model) and the alternative-hypothesis that α > 0. Provided in parenthesis are the p-value for these tests, with a * indicating significance on
a 5 % significance level.
↑ Bull 1 ↑ ↓ Bear 1 ↓ ↑ Bull 2 ↑ ↓ Bear 2 ↓ ↑ Bull 3 ↑ Total period
α (p-value) α (p-value) α (p-value) α (p-value) α (p-value) α (p-value)
Convertible Arbitrage 0.8 (0.000)* 0.6 (0.004)* 0.4 (0.009)* -2.2 (0.960) 0.6 (0.001)* 0.4 (0.001)*
Dedicated Short Bias -0.6 (0.799) 1.5 (0.065) -0.7 (0.920) 2.1 (0.072) -1.6 (0.999) -0.4 (0.921)
Emerging Markets 0.3 (0.324) -0.4 (0.744) 1.2 (0.000)* -2.7 (0.991) 0.4 (0.045)* 0.3 (0.143)
Equity Market Neutral 0.9 (0.000)* 0.6 (0.000)* 0.4 (0.000)* -3.0 (0.870) 0.0 (0.487) 0.2 (0.168)
Event Driven 0.9 (0.000)* 0.1 (0.322) 0.9 (0.000)* -1.6 (0.995) 0.4 (0.022)* 0.5 (0.000)*
–Distressed 1.1 (0.000)* 0.2 (0.246) 1.0 (0.000)* -1.8 (0.998) 0.5 (0.003)* 0.6 (0.000)*
–Multi-Strategy 0.8 (0.002)* 0.1 (0.401) 0.9 (0.000)* -1.4 (0.988) 0.4 (0.050) 0.4 (0.000)*
–Risk Arbitrage 0.6 (0.000)* 0.1 (0.289) 0.3 (0.001)* -0.5 (0.890) 0.1 (0.272) 0.2 (0.001)*
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.4 (0.012)* 0.4 (0.000)* 0.2 (0.049)* -2.2 (0.971) 0.5 (0.000)* 0.2 (0.019)*
Global Macro 1.2 (0.020)* 1.1 (0.001)* 0.8 (0.000)* -0.3 (0.628) 0.3 (0.005)* 0.7 (0.000)*
Long/Short Equity 1.6 (0.000)* -0.7 (0.920) 0.8 (0.000)* -1.8 (0.984) 0.4 (0.038)* 0.5 (0.002)*
Managed Futures 0.1 (0.379) 0.8 (0.127) 0.4 (0.208) 0.8 (0.152) 0.0 (0.461) 0.3 (0.096)
Multi-Strategy 0.8 (0.000)* 0.2 (0.102) 0.7 (0.000)* -1.8 (0.988) 0.6 (0.000)* 0.4 (0.000)*
CSHFI 1.2 (0.001)* -0.1 (0.597) 0.7 (0.000)* -1.6 (0.988) 0.4 (0.007)* 0.5 (0.000)*
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Looking at the individual strategies, the best performing strategy index in Bull 1 was
long/short equity, which exceeded similar investments with an average of 1.6 % per month.
The global macro index had the second highest excess return in Bull 1(1.2 %).
The worst performing strategy index in all of the bull periods is not surprisingly dedicated
short bias. More interesting is to look at the second worst performing strategy, which in
the first bull period was the managed futures index. This strategy index only exceeded
expectations with 0.1 %. Further on, if we look at its p-value (0.379), which indicates non-
significance, we can not say for certain that hedge funds in this index were able to beat the
market in Bull 1.
The emerging markets index had the highest alpha in Bull 2. This strategy index was up
0.9 percentage points from Bull 1, amounting to a total average of 1.2 % in the second bullish
period. Meanwhile the fixed income arbitrage funds performed second to worst, having the
smallest positive alpha of 0.2 %. Most of the hedge fund strategy indices have lower excess
returns in Bull 2 than in the in the first bullish period.
Lastly in Bull 3, the best strategy indices were: convertible arbitrage and multi-strategy,
with both of them exceeding their expectations with 0.6 % on average per month. Second
worst were the equity market neutral and managed futures indices. It is worth noting that
these two indices in Bull 3 were the only occasions when realized return equaled the expected
return from an investment with similar systematic risk, such that αˆ = 0.
To summarize, the strategy index with the highest excess return in bull markets is differ-
ent in each of the three time periods. Long/short equity, emerging markets, multi strategy
and convertible arbitrage are the strategy indices that are ranked number one in a bull pe-
riod. None of the strategy indices that are ranked the highest in one of the bull periods are
among the top three best performing in the other two periods. This finding is surprising and
makes it hard for us to draw any conclusions. The worst performing strategy index in the
bull periods (dedicated short bias excluded) is managed futures, which has the lowest excess
return in both Bull 1 and Bull 3 and the third lowest in Bull 2.
C. Excess Performance in Bear Markets
In the first bear period, two strategy indices had a negative alpha: emerging markets and
long/short equity. The other 11 of Credit Suisse’s hedge fund indices were able to outperform
the market and report excess returns. We see this result as a sign of strength, in a period
when the market declined by -48.4 %, most strategy indices seem to maintain excess returns.
Capocci & Hubner (2004) concluded that most hedge funds outperformed the market
in their whole test period, which was 1994–2002, and the best performing strategy was the
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Figure 2




























































This figure shows how much the average monthly return for every strategy in the Credit Suisse Hedge
Fund Index deviates from its expected return when considering systematic risk in bull and bear markets
respectively. The top picture shows the combined bull periods and the bottom picture shows the combined
bear periods. On the horizontal axes are the estimated betas and the vertical axes shows the average
monthly returns. The deviation from the security market line (drawn in the figures) can be interpreted as
the strategy’s alpha. Expected market return is assumed to be the same regardless of bull or bear market.
The risk-free interest rate is adjusted between bull and bear periods because the average yield of a 90-days
U.S. T-bill varied. (E.g. a risk-free investment, β = 0, was expected to yield rf = 0.21% in bull market and
rf = 0.24% in bear market.)
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market neutral strategy. This is partly consistent with our findings, which indicate that
almost all strategy indices outperformed the market both before and during the IT-crash.
However, equity market neutral is not the best one, but it is among the top three strategies.
Only three strategy indices reported statistically significant alphas during the IT-crash, the
other two were fixed income arbitrage and global macro. We believe that the differences in
results is likely due to the use of different databases.
The best strategy index in Bear 1 seems to be dedicated short bias, delivering a monthly
excess return of 1.5 %, but it is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.065). The reason
why the alpha is not statistically significant, even though it is well over zero, is because of
the high volatility of the funds in this index.
However, as Table III shows, the dedicated short bias index only contains three individual
funds. Our results then provides a link to other studies on selection-bias, such as the one
by Atiligan et al. (2013). Due to the low number of funds in Credit Suisse’s version of this
index, it will likely not be a good representation of the population of hedge funds that are
characterized by using this strategy.
The second best performing strategy index in Bear 1 is global macro with an average
excess return of 1.1 %. The managed futures index comes in third place with 0.8 %, although
not significant.
Looking at the second bear period, the financial crisis, alphas tends to overall be very
low. We see a big difference in the size of the alphas compared to the first bear period and
we can easily conclude that the strategy indices overall performed much worse in Bear 2
than in Bear 1.
The only strategy index, except from dedicated short bias, that seem to have a positive
alpha in Bear 2 is managed futures, however without significance on a 0.05 significance
level. The worst performing strategy indices in Bear 2 seem to be equity market neutral and
emerging markets, with alphas of -3.0 % and -2.7 % respectively.
It is easy to be fooled by the low alphas in Bear 2 and draw the conclusion that the
strategies have lower returns than MSCI WI. This is not the case, in fact, going back to
Table IV, we see that none of the 13 strategy indices decline as much as MSCI WI during
the financial crisis. The low obtained alphas in Bear 2 is a result of the fact that we use
the same expected market return in both bull and bear periods in our calculations. The
expected returns are therefore positive and at the same time almost all indices suffered from
big declines. This explains why we obtain negative alphas, while the hedge fund strategy
indices still beat the stock market on an absolute measure.
The negative alphas in general in Bear 2 tell us that the hedge fund managers ability to
hedge their assets during the financial crisis was much worse than during the IT-crash. An
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interesting topic for future research would be to examine the reasons why barely any hedge
fund strategy managed to maintain positive returns during the financial crisis, while almost
all hedge fund strategies seemed to be able to hedge, and maintain positive returns, during
the IT-crash.
To summarize, the two bear periods are very different when comparing the alphas. In
Bear 1, we find some statistically significant evidence for excess return while the alphas in
Bear 2 indicate no significant excess returns. In the first bear period, 11 of the strategy
indices seem to have positive alphas while in our second bear period, 11 strategy indices
seem to have negative alphas. The worst hedge fund strategy index in the bear periods
seems to be emerging markets, which has the second lowest alpha in both periods. The best
performing strategy indices in bear markets (except for dedicated short bias) seem to be
global macro and managed futures. Global macro has the second highest alpha in Bear 1
(1.1 %) and the third highest alpha in Bear 2 (-0.3 %). Managed futures seem to outperform
expectations in both bear periods with an alpha of 0.8 %.
D. Excess Performance in the Whole Period
If we take a look at the total period from January 1995 until May 2015 in Table V, we
see a similar pattern in the ranking of the performance as in the bull periods. The best
performing strategy index, with the highest alpha in the total period, is global macro with
an alpha of 0.7 %. This value is also statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000.
Our estimated alphas in the total period seem to correspond relatively well with what
earlier studies have found. Ackermann et al. (1999) find significantly positive alphas in all
their time periods, except in 1994–1995, with average values between 0.5 and 0.7 %. Our
alphas are not significantly positive in all periods, which could be due to the bear periods,
but the alpha of the composite CSHFI is 0.5 % and significant in the total period.
The beta for global macro is estimated to be 0.14. The indices that have around the
same beta as global macro (convertible arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage, event driven risk
arbitrage and multi-strategy) share similar systematic risk as global macro. In spite of that,
they at best delivered 0.3 lower percentage points in alpha than global macro for the whole
period (0.4 % for convertible arbitrage). A reason for this result is that global macro is an
index that contains more volatile funds than other ones that share the same systematic risk.
Another statistically significant result for the alphas in the whole period comes from the
long/short equity, event driven and event driven distressed strategies. They had betas of
0.45, 0.28 and 0.27 respectively, and on average earned excess returns of 0.5 % for long/short
and event driven, and 0.6 % for the sub-strategy: event driven distressed.
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In the total period the worst performing strategy is obviously dedicated short bias index.
Except from that, we cannot draw any further conclusions about other worst performing
strategies since many of our estimated alphas in the total period are of similar size and some
are also non-significant.
E. Volatility and Sharpe Ratio
Some hedge fund strategies might be more prone to take on risk than others, which
would explain the high returns seen in some of the strategies in Table IV. There is also the
possibility that it is the other way around, some hedge funds might have the aim to reduce
risk, which would provide a rationale for keeping slightly lower returns overall. A measure
for risk in terms of volatility is the standard deviation.
In Table VI, the standard deviations of all strategies during all time periods are displayed.
Since the total absolute returns for the strategies were much higher than our benchmark,
MSCI WI, one could think that the hedge fund strategies in general would have higher
standard deviations by taking on higher risks. However, that does not seem to be the case
when examining the standard deviation in the total period. Only the dedicated short bias
index shows a higher standard deviation than MSCI WI. The standard deviations of the
different strategies are in all but one case lower than the market index, ranging between 1.17
for event driven risk arbitrage and 4.76 for dedicated short bias in the total time period.
Global macro, with a total return of 818.6 %, has a standard deviation of 2.60 and
event driven distressed (+604.8 %) has a standard deviation of 1.81. One of the least volatile
strategies is multi-strategy, which in the case of Credit Suisse’s hedge funds, shows a monthly
standard deviation of 1.38. A possible explanation for the low standard deviation could
be that the manager can freely choose between investment strategies. This might lead to
increased diversification and therefore reduced risks compared to only investing in a single
asset-class or only using one strategy in all different types of markets.
The Sharpe ratios are reported in Table VII. In this table, we also include p-values, which
indicates the probability of the Sharpe ratios being greater than the Sharpe ratios of MSCI
WI. In the following analysis of the Sharpe ratios we focus on the Sharpe ratios in the total
period, because we do not find it relevant to isolate the risk-adjusted performance to either
bull or bear periods. A strategy with a high risk-adjusted return in bull periods but low
risk-adjusted return in bear periods does not seem like an attractive investment. Investors
looking at Sharpe ratios most likely want to know the risk-adjusted performance over a time
period that involves both bull and bear periods.
We can see that when adjusting for this risk, event driven distressed is the strategy
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Table VI
Standard Deviation of Strategy Indices
This table reports the monthly standard deviations of each strategy index in each time period. This is a
measure of volatility (or risk). A low standard deviation indicates low risk due to small fluctuations in the
return of the index. At the bottom of the table, we show the standard deviation of the composite CS Hedge
Fund Index and MSCI World.
Bull 1 Bear 1 Bull 2 Bear 2 Bull 3 Total
Convertible Arbitrage 1.40 1.24 1.12 4.56 1.55 1.88
Dedicated Short Bias 5.45 5.34 3.68 5.16 3.95 4.76
Emerging Markets 5.83 3.47 2.02 3.91 2.25 3.78
Equity Market Neutral 0.94 0.62 0.54 9.87 1.36 2.80
Event Driven 2.03 1.24 1.02 2.07 1.72 1.80
–Distressed 2.23 1.64 0.97 2.06 1.47 1.81
–Multi-Strategy 2.23 1.15 1.24 2.21 1.94 1.96
–Risk Arbitrage 1.45 1.18 0.87 1.40 0.94 1.17
Fixed Income Arbitrage 1.35 0.55 0.84 4.08 0.89 1.54
Global Macro 4.42 1.74 1.07 2.96 1.15 2.60
Long/Short Equity 3.58 2.52 1.56 2.96 2.02 2.70
Managed Futures 3.46 3.77 3.52 2.96 3.15 3.39
Multi-Strategy 1.24 0.77 0.95 2.71 1.11 1.38
CSHFI 2.92 1.52 1.08 2.48 1.31 2.02
MSCI World Index 3.78 4.49 2.77 6.00 4.20 4.37
index that has delivered the best risk-adjusted performance in the total sample period with
a Sharpe ratio of 1.31. Worth noting is that during the financial crisis, this strategy index
had the lowest Sharpe ratio of all strategies (−2.60). The Sharpe ratio in the total period
remains high due to its’ strong risk-adjusted performance in the other periods.
The strategy index with the second highest risk-adjusted performance is multi-strategy
which had a ratio of 1.27 in the total period. During the financial crisis, multi-strategy
had the second lowest Sharpe ratio. This leaves us with the interesting result that the two
strategy indices with the best risk-adjusted return in the total period are also the ones with
the worst risk adjusted performance during the financial crisis. It is beyond our article why











































Sharpe Ratios of Strategy Indices
This table reports annual Sharpe ratios (SR). They are calculated using the average of the 3-months U.S. treasury bill for each time period as the
risk-free interest rate. Hypothesis testing is done to see if the Sharpe ratios are significantly greater than the Sharpe ratio of MSCI World. Our
null-hypothesis is: SR = SRm and we check if SR > SRm. The p-values are presented in parenthesis. A * indicates significance on a 5 % significance
level.
Bull 1 Bear 1 Bull 2 Bear 2 Bull 3 Total
Annual risk-free rate (Rf ) 5.02 % 3.64 % 2.84 % 1.44 % 0.08 % 2.56 %
Convertible Arbitrage 1.71 (0.000)* 1.79 (0.000)* 1.20 (0.990) -1.43 (0.017)* 1.87 (0.000)* 0.84 (0.000)*
Dedicated Short Bias -0.62 (1.000) 0.90 (0.000)* -0.83 (1.000) 1.47 (0.000)* -1.26 (1.000) -0.49 (1.000)
Emerging Markets 0.17 (1.000) -0.38 (0.000)* 2.56 (0.000)* -1.93 (0.270) 1.27 (0.120) 0.42 (0.011)*
Equity Market Neutral 2.90 (0.000)* 3.03 (0.000)* 2.74 (0.000)* -0.87 (0.000)* 0.65 (1.000) 0.30 (0.264)
Event Driven 1.49 (0.005)* 0.25 (0.000)* 3.52 (0.000)* -2.22 (0.530) 1.43 (0.020)* 1.19 (0.000)*
–Distressed 1.65 (0.001)* 0.41 (0.000)* 3.97 (0.000)* -2.60 (0.786) 1.85 (0.000)* 1.31 (0.000)*
–Multi-Strategy 1.21 (0.130) 0.11 (0.000)* 2.87 (0.000)* -1.89 (0.235) 1.20 (0.227) 1.03 (0.000)*
–Risk Arbitrage 1.23 (0.105) 0.21 (0.000)* 1.50 (0.692) -0.83 (0.000)* 1.14 (0.362) 0.89 (0.000)*
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.62 (0.998) 2.44 (0.000)* 0.81 (1.000) -1.58 (0.051) 3.18 (0.000)* 0.59 (0.000)*
Global Macro 0.87 (0.840) 2.27 (0.000)* 2.87 (0.000)* -0.15 (0.000)* 1.84 (0.000)* 1.07 (0.000)*
Long/Short Equity 1.69 (0.000)* -0.90 (0.000)* 2.03 (0.025)* -1.75 (0.136) 1.30 (0.084) 0.87 (0.000)*
Managed Futures -0.07 (1.000) 0.71 (0.000)* 0.35 (1.000) 1.12 (0.000)* 0.26 (1.000) 0.30 (0.283)
Multi-Strategy 1.85 (0.000)* 0.63 (0.000)* 2.71 (0.000)* -1.95 (0.286) 2.61 (0.000)* 1.27 (0.000)*
CSHFI 1.36 (0.027)* -0.21 (0.000)* 2.53 (0.000)* -1.88 (0.229) 1.8 (0.000)* 0.97 (0.000)*
MSCI World Index 1.02 -1.67 1.59 -2.19 1.09 0.26
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further investigate.
The strategy index with the worst Sharpe ratio in the total period (−0.49) is non-
surprisingly dedicated short bias. Since the market and the hedge fund index have risen
a lot during the total time period, it is obvious that a strategy that only makes money
when financial instruments and stocks decline will have a hard time maintaining a positive
risk-adjusted return when the long term market trend is upwards.
If we again exclude the dedicated short bias strategy, the two other strategies with the
lowest Sharpe ratio in the total period (0.30) is managed futures and equity market neutral.
The low Sharpe ratio of equity market neutral is due to the big losses during the financial
crisis (this index declined most of all: -42.4 % in absolute return) and the relatively weak
bull period afterwards where the index only rose by 22.7 %, while MSCI WI in comparison
rose by 106.0 %.
The managed futures strategy index has a low Sharpe ratio due to the absence of time
periods with high returns. The period with the highest return for ”managed futures” was
the bull period before the financial crisis when the index rose by only 36.6 %. Worth noting
however, is that managed futures is the only strategy index with higher Sharpe ratios in
bear periods than in bull periods (dedicated short bias excluded).
To summarize, multi-strategy and event driven distressed are the two best performing
strategy indices on a risk-adjusted basis in the total time period. The strategy indices with
the worst risk-adjusted performance in the total time period, apart from dedicated short bias,
are managed futures and equity market neutral. However, even though managed futures has
the lowest Sharpe ratio in the total time period, it was the strategy index with the highest
risk-adjusted performance during the financial crisis.
F. The Optimal Hedge Fund Portfolio
In this section we use our results to construct market neutral portfolios. Since a primary
motive of investing in a hedge fund is to hedge against falling stock prices (Edwards &
Caglayan 2001), we find it relevant to make an attempt to derive high performing portfolios
with zero systematic risk. Inspired by a method used by Edwards & Caglayan (2001), we
rank the hedge fund strategies by their Sharpe ratios, then use the results to construct two
different portfolios. They rank different hedge fund styles and then compute the weights a
strategy should have in an optimal portfolio, based on their contribution to an optimally
diversified stock and bond portfolio. We use a similar method, we pick the highest performing
strategy indices in the total bull and bear periods respectively, equal-weight these indices in
a portfolio, add a short position in MSCI World Index to remove the systematic risk, and
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Table VIII
Returns of Market Neutral Portfolios
This table presents predicted and actual returns for three hypothetical portfolios during a 10-months period
from 1st of June 2015 – 31st of March 2016. The portfolios are constructed to concretize the implications of
our results. All portfolios are balanced with a short position in MSCI WI in order to eliminate systematic
risk by making them market neutral (β = 0). The size of the short position depends on the betas of the
strategy indices in the portfolios. Portfolio A consists of the two strategy indices with the highest Sharpe
ratios in the total bull period and the two indices with the highest Sharpe ratios in the total bear period.
Portfolio B consists of the two strategy indices with the highest alphas in the total bull period and the two
indices with the highest alphas in the total bear period. Portfolio C contains the CS Hedge Fund Index
which we include as a comparison. The predicted return for each strategy index is computed with CAPM,
using our previously estimated alphas and betas. The predicted return for MSCI WI is negative since we
short-sell the index, hence the β = −1.
Portfolio A – Strategy Indices With Highest Sharpe Ratios in Bull and Bear
Predicted return (%) Actual return (%) Weights
Long: Multi-Strategy 7.2 -0.4 22%
Long: Event Driven Distressed 8.9 -8.2 22%
Long: Managed Futures 5.1 1.5 22%
Long: Global Macro 10.1 -6.2 22%
Short: MSCI World Index -5.2 3.7 12%
Weighted zero-beta portfolio return 6.1 -2.5 100%
Portfolio B – Strategy Indices With Highest Alphas in Bull and Bear
Predicted return (%) Actual return (%) Weights
Long: Long/Short Equity 8.9 -4.3 19%
Long: Event Driven Distressed 8.9 -8.2 19%
Long: Global Macro 10.1 -6.2 19%
Long: Managed Futures 5.1 1.5 19%
Short: MSCI World Index -5.2 3.7 24%
Weighted zero-beta portfolio return 5.1 -2.5 100%
Portfolio C – The Index Portfolio
Predicted return (%) Actual return (%) Weights
Long: CS Hedge Fund Index 7.8 -6.0 78%
Short: MSCI World Index -5.2 3.7 22%
Weighted zero-beta portfolio return 4.9 -3.9 100%
The calculations of the predicted returns are explained more in detail in the appendix.
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then calculate the predicted returns.
The first portfolio consists of the two strategy indices with the highest Sharpe ratios in the
combined bull periods along with the two strategy indices with the highest Sharpe ratio in
the combined bear periods (dedicated short bias excluded). The second portfolio consists of
the two strategy indices with the highest alphas in the combined bull periods along with the
two strategy indices with the highest Sharpe ratio in the combined bear periods (dedicated
short bias excluded).
Even though dedicated short bias was the strategy index with the highest alpha and
highest Sharpe ratio in the bear period, we do not include it in any portfolio because it is a
big outlier. With a beta of −0.8 and an alpha of −1.0 in the bull period, it would not fit in
well in an optimal portfolio and it would lower the portfolios’ predicted returns.
In order to make both portfolios market neutral, we have to add a short position in MSCI
WI to the portfolios. The size of this position depends on the average beta of the portfolio.
As an example, consider a portfolio with assets worth 100 000 SEK and an average beta of
0.50. In order to make this portfolio market neutral, you would have to balance it with a
short position in MSCI WI (β = −1) of 50 000 SEK. This will result in an average portfolio
beta of zero.
When the portfolios are constructed, the expected returns of each strategy index and
the short MSCI WI position are estimated. Taking the weights into account, we can now
calculate the predicted return for the whole portfolio. The expected returns are calculated
by using the CAPM-model using our estimated alphas and betas. This process is explained
in more detail in Appendix. We test the performance of our optimal portfolios by comparing
the predicted return to the actual return during a 10-months period from 2015-06-01 to
2016-03-31.
Table VIII shows the predicted and actual returns for the portfolios. By looking at the
actual returns of Portfolio A and Portfolio B, we see that both have a negative yield of -
2.5 % during the 10-months period. The MSCI WI declined by 3.7 % during the same period.
When comparing the actual returns with the predicted returns, we see that neither of the
portfolios managed to yield close to what we had predicted.
Portfolio C contains a long position in CSHFI and a short position in MSCI WI. This is
included as a comparison, since this portfolio will not be strategy specific. We see that both
predicted and actual return, turned out to be lower for this portfolio compared to A and
B. This confirms that our strategy index picking for the other two portfolios was somewhat
relevant.
Despite the big deviations from the actual returns, we do not see the constructed port-
folios as a failure. The predicted returns are based on estimations of alphas and betas that
30 Performance of Hedge Fund Strategies in Bull and Bear Markets
are derived from data over the total time period 1995–2015 (245 months). The 10-months
period might just be too short to draw any conclusions about how well our optimal portfolios
will work.
In these discussions it is of interest to examine if past returns are indicative of persistently
good performances. If past returns are indicative for future returns, our portfolios should
yield at the predicted level of return since the predicted returns are based on historical data.
The results of Brown (1995), which shows that winning funds also tend to deliver a higher
return in future years, supports our theory that the portfolios should yield a return equal to
the predicted rate of return during a longer time period.
One should bear in mind that our constructed portfolios are hypothetical and the trans-
action costs for investing, or imitating, these portfolios might be high. One way to get around
this problem could be to pick a high-performing hedge fund from each of the strategy indices.
The predicted returns should be around the same, although the volatility might be higher
if individual funds are chosen instead of all the funds in the strategy index it belongs to.
Another solution could be to invest in ”funds-of-hedge-funds”, which is a type of fund that
holds a portfolio of many hedge funds.
To summarize, we tried to construct two optimal hedge fund portfolios with zero sys-
tematic risk, which in theory should yield 6.1 % and 5.1 % respectively during a 10-months
period. When we observe the actual returns of the portfolios and compare them to the pre-
dicted returns, we see that the yields were considerably lower than what we had predicted.
However, the analyzed time period is only 10 months and we believe that, over a longer time
period, these portfolios have the potential to yield at our predicted rate of return.
IV. Data Conditioning Biases
The unregulated nature of the hedge fund industry and the fact that hedge fund managers
can choose if they want to report hedge fund performance or not makes it extremely difficult
to construct a hedge fund index that does not suffer from various data-conditioning biases.
One problem that might cause biased returns is the absence of rules that regulate whether
a hedge fund must report their performance. This might lead to a selection bias, because of
the risk that the hedge funds in an index is not a random sample from the total population
of hedge funds (Atiligan et al. 2013).
Another type of bias that is addressed in almost every hedge fund study is survivorship
bias. A commonly used definition of survivorship bias in previous hedge fund studies is:
”the performance difference between surviving and dissolved funds” (Capocci et al. 2005).
In other words, the returns reported in hedge fund indices might be biased because the
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indices only include existing funds that have survived and managed to stay afloat, not the
funds that go bankrupt or stop reporting their performance (Atiligan et al. 2013). When
studying performance data of hedge fund databases, survivorship bias can be present in the
form of upward biased returns, since the dataset will likely contain fewer observations of
poor returns than expected (Bollen & Pool, 2009).
A third type of bias that many databases suffer from is backfilling bias. It is caused
by the fact that when a new fund enters a database, the database provider often requires
the fund to include its performance from previous years. Since inclusion in a database is
primarily a marketing tool used by hedge fund managers, the funds that enter a database
are the ones with a positive return history and thus causing an upward bias in the database
(Ackermann et al. 1999). However, in our study we do not have to worry about backfilling
bias since new funds in the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Database are added on a going-forward
basis and do not require inclusion of historical performance.
A popular method of examining the presence of survivorship bias, used by Capocci &
Hubner (2004), Capocci et al. (2005) and Ackermann et al. (1999) among others, is to
compare the return, median and standard deviation of the surviving funds with the dis-
solved funds and thereafter measure the size of the differences in order to draw conclusions.
Unfortunately, the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Database that we use do not report sufficient
information that we need to conduct the test for survivorship bias. Credit Suisse states that
they are minimizing the problem with survivorship bias by not removing the funds from
the indices until they are fully liquidated. However, they also state that they exclude funds
from the indices that do not comply with the financial reporting requirements and we find
it difficult to believe that hedge funds in the liquidation process always continue to provide
performance data. Hence, we believe that there is a possibility that survivorship bias is still
present in the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indices. Since we cannot do the tests ourselves,
we will present brief results from other studies that have had access to more comprehensive
datasets and conducted survivorship bias tests.
Ackermann et al. (1999) present interesting results, as they find direct evidence for
survivorship bias, but however this bias is countered by a self-selection bias. They explain
that the self-selection is present because funds with superior performance may voluntarily
withdraw from the database because they can raise sufficient funds on their own without
inclusion in a database, and this will cause a downward bias in the data. Their conclusion is
that the upward bias caused by survivorship and the downward bias caused by self-selection
appear to offset each other, thus survivorship bias does not pose a problem.
The reader should bear in mind that these tests were conducted on a different dataset
and from another database so the results might not be completely transferable to our data.
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However other studies, e.g. Capocci et al. (2005) and Capocci & Hubner (2004), where they
ran similar tests have found that the impact of survivorship bias was kept at very reasonable
levels. Hedge fund data after 1994 appears to contain less survivorship bias, because before
1994, databases only kept track of surviving funds (Capocci & Hubner 2004). Hendricks et
al. (1993) note that hedge fund data for the pre-1994 period contain obvious survivorship
bias that is very likely to hinder statistical inference.
In this discussion it is also interesting to examine contributing factors to an individual
funds survival as a business. Specifically, we want to look at factors that affect survival
of hedge funds. One explanation lies in the compensation structure for managers that are
typically seen in hedge funds. Managers usually receive incentive fees for earnings above a
watermark and have to make up for past losses before they can earn a profit. If returns fall
below the watermark for a period, the manager will not be as willing to invest new money,
which ultimately leads to its demise (Brown, 1995).
V. Conclusion
The popular perception is still to this day that hedge funds are a relatively homogenous
group that follows a well-defined market neutral strategy. As have been shown throughout
the paper, this happens to not be the case, since there instead is a large number of investment
strategies used by hedge fund managers. This article investigates the performance between
13 different hedge fund strategies during a 20-years long period from 1995 to 2015. We
first determine five distinct sub-periods that have been particularly bullish or bearish on the
global stock market and then set out to find the best performing hedge fund strategies in
both the bull and bear markets.
With data from the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Database, reporting monthly returns for
13 strategy indices, we evaluate each index’ performance by testing for excess returns using
the CAPM-model and analyzing their risk-adjusted returns by calculating Sharpe ratios.
The analysis of performance shows that most hedge fund strategies in the Credit Suisse
Hedge Fund Index report statistically significant excess returns, compared to the market
in the total time period. There are big differences in performance amongst the individual
strategies as well as potentially an enormous issue with data bias. The return for the com-
posite index during the total time period is 460.6 %, compared to 150.1 % for MSCI World
Index, despite Credit Suisse’s index having a lower volatility. It does not in any regard
seem likely that almost all hedge fund strategies would perform better than the MSCI WI,
therefore we believe that our results are overly positive.
Global macro is the best hedge fund strategy over the total time period when risk is not
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accounted for. When risk is accounted for, the best performing hedge fund strategy in the
total time period is event driven distressed, closely followed by multi-strategy.
We cannot draw a clear conclusion about which strategy is best in bull periods, because
the strategy indices with the highest excess return were different in each of the periods. The
strategies that performed the best in one bull period also performed relatively poor in the
other two periods. The strategy indices with highest alphas in one of the bull periods are:
long/short equity, emerging markets, multi-strategy and convertible arbitrage. The worst
strategy, by a mile, in the bull periods is non-surprisingly dedicated short bias. The second
worst strategy is managed futures, due to it’s modest absolute returns.
In the bear periods, the overall difference in hedge fund performance between the two ex-
amined periods is remarkable. Almost all hedge fund strategies performed well and reported
positive absolute returns during the IT-crash, while barely any strategy could maintain pos-
itive returns during the financial crisis. The best hedge fund strategy in bear markets is
dedicated short bias. The second best strategy during the bear periods is managed futures,
which is also the only strategy with positive returns during all five examined time periods.
We made an attempt to construct high-yielding market neutral portfolios by combining
the best performing strategy indices and then predict their returns. As our predictions did
not correspond with actual returns, we conclude that the negative result was likely due to
too few observations.
As a final comment on our results, we believe that our underlying data might be subject
to large biases due to the fact that hedge funds with poor performance do not have to disclose
their performance. This makes it difficult to prove that hedge funds are in fact performing
better than the market. However, the results of our thesis clearly highlights the performance
differences between the strategies in Credit Suisse’s hedge fund database.
This study contributes to existing research by analyzing hedge fund performance during
multiple long-term bull and bear periods on the market and by including data from the
financial crisis, when hedge funds performed poorly. Many other studies on hedge fund
performance were conducted in the 1990s, while ours presents results that are more up-to-
date. The main lesson to be drawn from this paper is that hedge funds use many different
strategies and the performance varies greatly, depending on which strategy a fund uses.
An investor that is considering investing in a hedge fund should be aware of how the risk
exposure and return outcome vary between the different strategies. Our paper can be used
as a basis before making a decision about which type of hedge fund to invest in.
One thing that is beyond the scope of this study is breaking down each hedge fund
strategy and doing a more in-depth analysis of the determinants of the returns. Another
interesting point, which we do not treat in this paper, is analyzing why many hedge funds
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managed to maintain good performance during the IT-crash but not during the financial
crisis. We leave these two areas open and encourage other financial analysts to investigate
it further.
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APPENDIX
Sharpe Ratios’ Standard Errors
When doing hypothesis testing and generating a p-value, we first assume that the returns
are independent and identically distributed. Since the Sharpe ratio function, SR = g(µ, σ),
takes two normally distributed variables as inputs, we have to use a special approach to
calculate the standard errors. This method is described by Andrew W. Lo (2002), who

















where n is the number of observations in the sample and SˆR is the Sharpe ratio calculated
using Equation 3.
Strategy Indices Ranking and Calculations of Predicted Return
Table IX below shows the ranking of the top 5 highest performing strategy indices in the
total bull period (Panel A) and the total bear period (Panel B). In the left column, they
are ranked by their alpha and in the right column they are ranked by their Sharpe ratio.
Only the top 5 strategy indices are included in the ranking of performance, as only the top
2 are of interest. When constructing the portfolios in Section III–F, the two highest ranked
strategy indices were chosen from each performance measurement.
For Portfolio A, we included the two indices with the highest Sharpe ratio in bull and
bear markets respectively. We did the same with Portfolio B, but in this portfolio we used
the indices with the highest alpha instead. We choose to exclude dedicated short bias, even
though it had the highest alpha and Sharpe ratio in the bear periods. Because of it being a
big outlier, with a beta of −0.8 and an alpha of −1.0 in bull periods, it would not fit in well
in an optimal portfolio. It would also significantly lower the portfolios’ predicted returns.
To calculate the predicted monthly return for each strategy index in the portfolios, we
use the following equation:
E[r] = αˆ + r¯f + βˆ · (r¯m − r¯f ),
Table IX
Strategy Indices Ranking
Panel A – Bull Markets
Ranking: Strategy Alpha Strategy Sharpe
# 1 Long/Short Equity 0.9 Multi-Strategy 2.33
# 2 E.D. Distressed 0.8 E.D. Distressed 2.01
# 3 Global Macro 0.7 Event Driven 1.76
# 4 Event Driven 0.7 Convertible Arbitrage 1.61
# 5 CSHFI 0.7 CSHFI 1.50
Panel B – Bear Markets
Ranking Strategy Alpha Strategy Sharpe
# 1 Dedicated Short Bias 1.8 Dedicated Short Bias 1.12
# 2 Managed Futures 0.8 Managed Futures 0.83
# 3 Global Macro 0.4 Global Macro 0.65
# 4 E.D. Risk Arbitrage -0.1 E.D. Risk Arbitrage -0.29
# 5 Convertible Arbitrage -0.4 Equity Market Neutral -0.37
where βˆ is the strategy index’ estimated beta, which are shown in Table IV, r¯m is the average
monthly return of MSCI WI from 1995 to 2015 (0.53 %) and r¯f is the average monthly return
of the U.S. 90-days T-bill during 1995–2015 (0.21 %).
We use the estimated αˆ from the total time period in our predictions, not any of the
estimations during only the bull or bear periods. We do this because we do not know the
direction of the market in the future and therefore have to use the alpha that is estimated
during the total time period.
After we have calculated the monthly predicted returns we use the following formula to
convert them into 10-months predicted returns:
R¯ = (1 + r¯)10 − 1
